ABSTRACT. In 
Introduction
Logical consequence is one of fundamental concepts in mathematical and computer modelling of human reasoning. At the syntactical level, there are two components generating logical consequence -axioms and inference rules. But logical consequence can also be described semantically, in terms of truth values of formulas in appropriate classes of models. And given a collection of assumptions, we may be interested in knowing their consequences within a certain logic.
The strongest kind of logical consequence coherent with the set of theorems of any logic was introduced by P. Lorenzen (1955) ; this consequence is generated by socalled admissible inference rules. Since then, admissible rules have been investigated for various non-classical logics from different viewpoints. One of the prime questions in this research is whether there is an algorithm deciding admissible rules for a given logic L. Initially H. Friedman addressed this question to the intuitionistic logic IPC (cf. Problem 39, (Friedman, 1975) ). The interest in this question came from the observation by R. Harrop (Harrop, 1960) that IPC is structurally incomplete, i.e. it has admissible, but not derivable rules. G. Mints (Mints, 1976) found some sufficient conditions for derivability of admissible rules in IPC. Friedman's problem was solved positively by Rybakov (Rybakov, 1984) . Afterwards the decision problem for admissible rules and related problems in admissible inferences were studied for many other non-classical logics, but the best progress was achieved in transitive modal logics and superintuitionistic logics.
For instance, A. Kuznetsov (1973) raised the question, whether IPC has a finite base for admissible rules. First results in this direction were obtained by A. Citkin (Citkin, 1975) who found a base for all quasi-characteristic rules admissible in IPC, but the general question was solved by Rybakov (Rybakov, 1985) as negative: finite bases do not exist. Later R. Iemhoff (Iemhoff, 2000) found an explicit base for rules admissible in IPC and constructed a characterization of IPC by means of this base (Iemhoff, 2001) . Slightly earlier an implicit base -just a recursive one -was proposed by Rybakov, Terziler, Rimazki (Rybakov et al., 2000b) .
S. Ghilardi (Ghilardi, 1999) discovered an approach to unification in IPC via projective formulas, which in particular, gives a new efficient algorithm deciding the admissibility of inference rules. The other way round, inference rules in a generalized form (with meta-variables) can be used to describe unifiable formulas. In particular, a decision procedure for IPC-admissibility found by Rybakov (Rybakov, 1992) can also check unification in IPC and verify solvability of logical equations. Similar results for modal transitive logics are presented, in particular, in the book (Rybakov, 1997) . A complete characterization of hereditarily structurally complete modal logics above K4 is given in (Rybakov, 1995) .
Another interesting observation is a crucial difference between refutation of formulas and refutation of inference rules. For example, Rybakov, Kiyatkin, Oner (Rybakov et al., 1999) showed that the great majority of modal logics above S4 with the finite model property (fmp) do not have the fmp w.r.t. inference rules. An application of admissible rules to the problem of monotonicity was found by Rybakov, Fedorishin (Rybakov et al., 2000a) .
For the case of multi-modal logics, relatively few results on admissible inference rules are known -in these logics it is more difficult to construct decision procedures for rules. But study of these problems makes sense , because multi-modal logic is an attractive area, with quite useful applications to AI (cf. (Baader et al., 1995; Bennett et al., 2002; Fine et al., 1996; Marx et al., 1997) ). In particular, products of modal logics (cf. Gabbay, Shehtman (Gabbay et al., 1998) ) have been intensively studied in recent years, cf. the book Gabbay, et al., (Gabbay et al., 2003) incorporating many contemporary results.
In this paper we are interested in multi-modal logics with the universal modality. Perhaps the first serious investigation of these logics was made by Goranko and Passy (Goranko et al., 1992) . We can say that logics with the universal modality combine a fragment of first-order logic with modal logics. Quantification over all worlds makes the language much more expressive, and therefore these logics have, in particular, a useful application in spatio-temporal reasoning (Bennett et al., 2002) .
In our recent paper (Golovanov et al., 2005) inference rules were studied for the multi-modal logic of Visibility, Perception and Knowledge, which is just S5 2 with the universal modality. In a private conversation V. Shehtman proposed to extend the research to a larger class of multi-modal logics. So the present paper investigates admissible rules for multi-modal logics with the universal modality extending the multi-modal analogue of the logic S4.
In the introductory section we recall some necessary general definitions and notation. The next section introduces the notion of an admissible rule (consecution) and briefly discusses known results. Section 4 includes the main results. We begin with a definition of the context effective finite model property; basing on this property, we develop a technique for handling admissible consecutions in logics with the universal modality. The main theorem of this section (Theorem 7) gives a sufficient condition for decidability of admissible consecutions in logics with the universal modality. In the next section we prove that all multi-modal logics with the universal modality and the effective filtration property satisfy the conditions of Theorem 7 and hence they are all decidable w.r.t. admissible rules. Some applications of this theorem are given. General definitions, notation and conventionally known results that we use, are standard and can be found in contemporary literature (cf., for instance, (Chagrov et al., 1997; Rybakov, 1997) ). We briefly recall all necessary notation and previous results; so this paper is largely self-contained.
Preliminaries and notation
The language L n of multi-modal propositional logic consists of a countable set of proposition letters (denoted by lowersize Latin letters, possibly with subscripts), Boolean logical connectives, and a finite set of unary modal connectives i , 1 ≤ i ≤ n. The formation rules for formulas are standard. ♦ i α is the abbreviation for the formula ¬ i ¬α. A multi-modal logic (or, to be more precise, an n-modal logic) is a set L of formulas in L n containing all classical tautologies, the axioms i (p → q) → ( i p → i p) for all i, and closed under substitutions, Modus Ponens, and the rules of necessitatation: α/ i α for every i. In the sequel multi-modal logics are called just "logics".
We say that a logic L is with the universal modality if its language contains a modal connective u (called the universal modality) and the following formulas are in L (for any i):
S4 n U denotes the smallest (n + 1)-modal logic with the universal modality containing the formulas
An n-frame F is a tuple F, R 1 , . . . , R n , where F is a non-empty set (the base), and R i ⊆ F × F . We use the notation |F| for F ; a ∈ F abbreviates a ∈ |F|.
A frame F is said to be rooted if there exists a ∈ F such that, for any b = a in F,
where R ij are some accessibility relations from F.
The truth relation is extended to all modal formulas built from the set of letters P in a standard way. If for a formula α and a world a ∈ F, (F, a) V α, we say that α is true at a under V . If (F, a) V α for all a ∈ F, we say that α is true in the model F, V . If the frame F is clear from the context, we use the notation a V α rather than (F, a) V α. If a formula α is true in all models based on F, we say that α is valid in F and write F α. In the cases when n is inessential, we call n-frames just "frames".
A standard well known fact is that for any frame F, the set of formulas
A logic L has the finite model property (fmp, in the sequel) if for any formula α ∈ L there is a finite L-frame such that F α. L is said to have the fmp with an effective upper bound (efmp) if the following holds: there exists a computable function g such that for any α ∈ L, there is a finite L-frame F refuting α, with ||F|| ≤ g(n), where n = ||Sub(α) ||, Sub(α) is the set of all subformulas of α, and ||F|| denotes the cardinality of the base set of F.
Admissible logical consecutions: some basic facts
First let us briefly recall the definition of admissible consecutions and also some results and technique. For a propositional logic L, a consecution, or an inference rule is an expression Let L be a logic given by a certain axiomatic system AS L with a set of axioms Ax L and a set of inference rules Rl L . For a set of formulas Γ and a formula α, we write
That is, there is a derivation of α using only the rules from Rl L , the axioms from Ax L , and the assumptions Γ.
It may happen that for a logic L with a given axiomatic system, a formula β is not derivable from the premises α 1 , ..., α m , but still the consecution cs := α 1 , ..., α m /β is applicable, because it derives L-provable conclusions from L-provable premises.
The class consisting of all the rules that for a certain logic L, derive L-provable formulas from L-provable assumptions, was introduced into consideration by Lorenzen (1955) : this is the class of all admissible rules. For a propositional logic L, a consecution (a rule)
So cs is admissible iff L (as a set of formulas) is closed under cs.
The earliest example of a rule admissible in intuitionistic propositional logic IPC, but not derivable in Heyting axiomatic system H IP C for IPC, is Harrop rule (Harrop, 1960) :
Similarly, Lemmon-Scott rule (cf. (Rybakov, 1997) )
is admissible, but not derivable in modal logics S4, S4.1 and Grz with standard Hilbert-style axiomatizations.
In the sequel we use the term consecution rather than rule, because we would like to emphasize that the main object of our research is logical consequence relation but not structure of derivations.
In this paper we investigate consecutions admissible in logics extending S4 n U. For this purpose let us recall the definition and properties of n-canonical models for multimodal logics.
For a given n, the n-canonical model
e., maximal Lconsistent sets of formulas in letters p 1 , . . . , p n ). For any i ≤ k, and for any X, Y ∈ M n , XR i Y iff for any formula i ϕ, i ϕ ∈ X ⇒ ϕ ∈ Y . For any j ≤ n, the valuation G of p j in M n is defined as follows:
The corresponding frame M n , R 1 , . . . , R k is also called n-canonical. A well-known standard fact is Canonical Model Theorem: for any formula ϕ(p 1 , . . . , p n ), for any
For a frame F and a valuation V of all proposition letters of a given consecution cs, we say that F refutes cs under V (notation: F V cs) if all premises of cs are true under V at all worlds of F, but there is a world a ∈ F refuting the conclusion of cs under V.
Writing down a consecution in the form cs(x 1 , . . . , x k ) shows that all proposition letters occurring in the premises and the conclusion of this consecution are among x 1 , . . . , x k . For a given model M = F , V and another valuation V 1 of a set of proposition letters Q in F, V 1 is said to be definable in M if, for any q ∈ Q, there is a formula α q in proposition letters from the domain of V such that V 1 (q) = {a ∈ F | a V α q }. In the sequel we use the following simple fact (for the proof cf. for instance, (Rybakov, 1997) , Theorem 3.3.3).
LEMMA 1. -A consecution cs is not admissible in a logic L iff there exists a number n such that the n-canonical frame of L refutes cs under a definable valuation.
For a consecution cs, Sub(cs) denotes the set of all subformulas of the premises and the conclusion of cs.
Main Results on Admissibility

DEFINITION 2. -A logic L has the context effective finite model property (cefmp) if there is a computable function g such that for any consecution cs and any finite L-frame refuting cs, there exists a rooted finite L-frame F 1 refuting cs, with ||F 1 || ≤ g(||Sub(cs)||).
Note that the fmp with an effective upper bound does not always imply the cefmp. In the sequel n denotes a singleton frame with n reflexive relations.
and L has the fmp and the cefmp. Suppose a consecution cs is not admissible in L. Then (i) there exists a finite L-frame U which is an R u -cluster of size computable from the size of cs such that U refutes cs under some valuation;
(ii) there is a valuation V of proposition letters from cs in n+1 such that the premises of cs are true in ( n+1 , V ).
Since L has the fmp, (3) implies that there is a finite L-frame F refuting the formula ψ(µ 1 , . . . µ n ) under some valuation V 1 . From (2), we readily obtain that all formulas ϕ j (µ 1 , . . . , µ n ) are true in F, V 1 . Take the valuation V 2 for letters x i of cs such that
It is clear that F, V 2 refutes the consecution cs. Using the cefmp for L, we conclude that there is a rooted finite L-frame F 1 refuting cs, of size effectively computable from the size of cs. Now since F 1 is rooted and L ⊇ S4 u , we obtain that F 1 is an R u -cluster.
(ii) readily follows from L ⊆ L( ) and (2). PROOF. -Suppose L satisfies (i), and U is a finite R u -cluster and an L-frame refuting a consecution
under a valuation V :
We may assume that | U | = {1, . . . , m}. Associate a new proposition letter p a with every world a of U . Extend the original valuation V to all the p a by putting V (p a ) := {a}. Let
and let F or P be the set of all formulas in letters from P . For any a ∈ U , put
The set T h a is a maximal L-n-theory, for n := k + m. Take the n-canonical model M n (L) for L, where n := ||P || and the domain of the valuation G in M n (L) coincides with P . Then T h a ∈ M n (L) for any a. In particular,
In fact, the assumption U |= aR i b and the definition of 
The assertion (5), in particular, implies
On the other hand, (4) entails that
Take any c ∈ U and T h c . By (6),
and by (7)
which is a contradiction. So the models
, and the models
To compare U to other R u -clusters from M n (L), we will use Jankov formulas (cf. (Chagrov et al., 1997) ). Recall that by our choice, V (p a ) = {a} for any world a ∈ U . Let
for any R i ,
and
is a Jankov-style formula, which allows us to describe models up to p-morphism:
PROOF. -In fact, the condition f : V 1 (p a ) → {a} yields us a required p-morphism. The proof is by a standard argument for Jankov formulas (cf. (Chagrov et al., 1997) ).
It is also easy to see that ϕ( U ) is true in U , V 2 and consequently in the model Rep( U ), G also. Take the following valuation V 3 for variables x j of cs definable in M n (L):
The valuation V 3 coincides with the valuation G in Rep( U ), and consequently V 3 refutes cs in Rep( U ).
, then under V 3 , the premise of cs is true at all elements of .
PROOF. -Let V 4 be the valuation of letters {p a | a ∈ U } obtained by restriction of G to . By Lemma 5, there is a p-morphism f from , V 4 to U , V 2 , where V 2 is the restriction of V to {p a | a ∈ U }. Now it is important to note that by our choice of V 3 , f is also a p-morphism w.r.t. valuations V 3 and V . In fact, assume
a, and, as pointed out above, b) , and the fact that ( U , f (b)) V x j together with the definition of V 3 imply ( , b) V3 x j . Thus f is a p-morphism w.r.t. V 3 and V .
Since p-morphisms preserve truth-values of formulas and the premise of cs is true at all elements of U w.r.t. V (V refutes cs in U ), we conclude that the same holds for all elements of w.r.t. V 3 .
(Continuation of the proof of Lemma 4.) Now we slightly amend the valuation V 3 . By conditions of our lemma, the premise of cs is true at under some valuation Q. Fix such a valuation and put
, the truth values of variables x j w.r.t. V 4 are the same as the truth values of x j in w.r.t. Q. So the premise of cs is true w.r.t. V 4 at all elements from G(¬ϕ( U )). Combining this with Lemma 6, we conclude that the premise of cs is true w.r.t. V 4 at all worlds of M n (L). As we have proved above, V 3 refutes the conclusion of cs in G(ϕ( U )) so V 4 also does. Consequently by Lemma 1, cs is not admissible in L.
We say that a logic L is decidable w.r.t. finite frames if, we can effectively recognize whether an arbitrary finite frame is an L-frame. There is an obvious exampleany logic with a finite set of axioms is decidable w.r.t. finite frames. If the class of L-frames is definable by a finite set of first-order or second-order sentences, then L is again decidable w.r.t. finite frames.
Using Lemmas 3 and 4 we immediately deduce our main theorem:
and L has the fmp and the cefmp, then L is decidable w.r.t. admissible consecutions.
Applications
This section contains applications of Theorem 7 to particular multi-modal logics. First we describe a construction, which generates logics with universal modalities from arbitrary multi-modal logics. 
This definition formalizes and generalizes the well known notion of standard filtration, and therefore the mapping f has the following property: PROOF. -We will show that, for any L u -frame refuting a consecution cs, there is a finite L u -frame refuting cs which has the size effectively bounded from the size of cs. This, in particular, is sufficient to show that L u has the fmp and the cefmp (because L u is Kripke complete by definition).
Consider an L u -frame F refuting cs under a valuation V . Obviously we may assume that F is an R u -cluster, let M := F, V . The frame F R u obtained from F by omitting R u is an L-frame. Consider the set Sub(cs) u consisting of all formulas from Sub(cs) without occurrences of u . By the effective filtration property applied to Recall (Gabbay et al., 2003) To use Theorem 11 here, we have to show the effective filtration property. For the latter, it is sufficient to apply a standard filtration technique: take the transitive closures of all accessibility relations in the smallest filtration.
